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BOND V. UNITED STATES:
DECIPHERING MISSOURI V.
HOLLAND AND THE
APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF
CONGRESS’S POWERS WHEN
IMPLEMENTING A NON-SELFEXECUTING TREATY
*

STEPHANIE PERAL
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress’s legislative authority is normally limited to its
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution. However, the
1
Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland muddled the
limitations imposed by Article I when Congress passes legislation
2
implementing a federal treaty. In Bond v.United States, the Supreme
Court will revisit Holland and have the opportunity to definitively
dictate Congress’s powers when implementing a valid federal treaty.
Decided over ninety years ago, Missouri v. Holland, is the seminal
case on the extent of the Congressional treaty power. It involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Treaty
3
Implementation Act (MBTA). The MBTA was passed by Congress
to meet the United States’ obligations to protect migratory birds in
4
the United States and Canada. The MBTA accomplished this by
making it unlawful to kill, capture, or sell any migratory birds
5
protected by the Act.
In Holland, the State of Missouri challenged the constitutionality
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Duke University School of Law.
1. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
2. No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 10, 2013).
3. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703–710 (West 2013).
4. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
5. 16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (West 2013).
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of the MBTA by claiming that it infringed on rights reserved to the
6
states under the Tenth Amendment. To decide whether or not the
MBTA’s restrictions violated states’ rights, the Court had to look
beyond the Tenth Amendment because “by Article 2, Section 2, the
power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6
7
treaties . . . are declared the supreme law of the land.” Therefore, the
Court stated that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and
8
proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”
The Court found that the underlying treaty did not violate any
express provision of the Constitution, and then sought to determine
whether the underlying treaty was “forbidden by some invisible
9
radiation” from the Tenth Amendment. In rejecting Missouri’s
argument, the Court found that the states alone could not adequately
10
protect migratory birds. Instead, the Court found that the protection
of migratory birds was indeed a “national interest of . . . the first
magnitude” and held the underlying treaty valid and thus the MBTA
11
constitutional.
Nearly one hundred years later, Bond v. United States raises an
important and unanswered constitutional question after Holland:
What exactly is the limit to Congress’s powers when implementing a
non-self-executing treaty?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 13, 1993, the United States entered into a treaty that
sought to achieve “effective progress towards general and complete
12
disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (the
Convention) was a non-self-executing treaty that hoped to achieve
either the prohibition or elimination of all weapons of mass
6. 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). The Tenth Amendment states “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
7. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
8. Id. at 432.
9. Id. at 434.
10. Id. at 435.
11. Id.
12. United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, Preamble, Jan. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter the Convention].
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13

destruction. As such, the Convention forbade all parties to it from
14
creating, using, or encouraging the use of chemical weapons. In
particular, the Convention included a Verification Annex that listed a
15
variety of prohibited toxic chemicals.
Accordingly, Congress passed the Chemical Weapons Act, § 229 of
which made it illegal for any person to “develop, produce . . . use, or
16
threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”
Sixteen years after the United States entered into the Convention,
Carol Anne Bond discovered that her best friend, Myrlinda Haynes,
17
was pregnant and that Bond’s husband was the baby’s father. Bond
18
sought revenge. She stole 10–chloro10H–phenoxarsine from Rohm
& Haas, the chemical manufacturer where she was employed as a
microbiologist, and also ordered potassium dichromate over the
19
Internet. Both chemicals can cause physical harm through minimal
20
topical contact.
Over the next several months, Bond spread the chemicals over
Haynes’ car and mailbox making 24 attempts to poison Haynes
21
overall. For the most part, Haynes was able to avoid touching the
22
chemicals, with the exception of once suffering a burn to her thumb.
23
Finally, Haynes informed the local police about the situation. The
24
police merely advised her to wipe the substances off. Unsatisfied
with the police’s response, Haynes reported the matter to the local
postal carriers, who then referred the matter to the United States
25
Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
13. Id. Non-self-executing treaties grant Congress the power to make changes in domestic
law in order to implement the provisions of the treaty, while self-executing treaties do not
require any enforcing legislation. Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing
Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1450 n.3 (1994). The Convention is a non-self-executing treaty because it
has been assumed that a treaty creating a federal crime requires Congress to enact legislation
before any individual could be punished. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111
cmt. f (1987).
14. The Convention, supra note 12 at art. I.
15. Id. at annex.
16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013).
17. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 131–32.
21. Id. at 132.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The USPIS placed surveillance cameras throughout Haynes’
26
property, which caught Bond planting the chemicals. Bond was
arrested and a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
indicted her on two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon
27
in violation of § 229 of The Chemical Weapons Act.
Bond claimed that § 229 violated principles of federalism and
28
moved to dismiss the charges. The district court denied Bond’s
motions, and she pled guilty to all charges. Bond was sentenced to six
29
30
years in prison, but she reserved her right to appeal. On appeal to
the Third Circuit, Bond again argued that § 229 violated the
Constitution by allowing the federal government to legislate in areas
31
of law reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Before
reaching Bond’s federalism argument, however, the Third Circuit held
that Bond lacked standing to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge
32
because her suit lacked any representation by a state or its officers.
33
The Third Circuit then affirmed the District Court’s sentence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court solely confronted the standing
issue and stated that “[a]n individual has a direct interest in objecting
to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National
Government and the States . . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is
34
not for the States alone to vindicate.” Thus finding that Bond had
35
standing, the Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit.
On remand, Bond again argued that § 229, as applied to her, was
an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment because it
allowed the federal government to intrude on a state’s right to punish
36
assaults. In denying Bond’s claims, the Third Circuit relied heavily on
Holland’s holding that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute
about the validity of the [implementing] statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of
37
the Government.” The Third Circuit said that Holland stands for the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 142.
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
Id. at 2367.
United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2012).
252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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proposition that “when there is a valid treaty, Congress has [the]
authority to enact implementing legislation under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, even if it might otherwise lack the ability to legislate in
38
the domain in question.” The Third Circuit then held the Convention
to be a valid treaty because it dealt with a matter of international
39
concern.
Although the Third Circuit followed Holland in noting that a valid
treaty grants Congress powers under the Necessary and Proper
40
Clause to enact it, this did not end the inquiry. The court noted that §
229 must still meet the “Necessary and Proper Clause’s general
requirement that legislation implemented under that Clause be
‘rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
41
enumerated power.’” The court found such rational relation,
observing that § 229 closely follows the language of the Convention
42
and did not disrupt the balance between federal and state authority.
43
The Third Circuit then re-affirmed Bond’s sentence, and the
44
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Holland Court held that Congress may use the Necessary and
Proper Clause to implement a treaty even if the implementing
45
legislation would otherwise be beyond Congress’s Article I powers.
With its second holding, Holland created confusion concerning the
breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause when used by Congress
to pass legislation implementing a federal treaty.
The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Congress has the
power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into the execution . . . all . . . powers vested by this
46
Constitution.” In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held
that laws are “necessary and proper” as long as the end is legitimate
and within the scope of the Constitution and the means are plainly

38.
39.
.
40
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Bond, 681 F.3d at 157.
Id. at 161–62.
252 U.S at 432.
Bond, 681 F.3d at 157 (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)).
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 10, 2013).
Holland. 252 U.S. at 432.
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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47

adapted to reach that end. In determining whether the McCulloch
test is met, courts look to whether a statute is “rationally related to
48
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”
Therefore, when the Court held in Holland that if a treaty “is valid
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article
I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of
49
the Government,” the implication was that a statute implementing a
valid treaty automatically passes the McCulloch test. Consequently,
courts have sometimes cited Holland as standing for the proposition
that the Tenth Amendment is not a barrier to Congress’ powers when
50
implementing a valid treaty. For example, in United States v. Lue, the
Second Circuit stated that “[i]f the Hostage Taking Convention is a
valid exercise of the Executive’s treaty power, there is little room to
dispute that the legislation passed to effectuate the treaty is valid
51
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have pushed back
interpreting Holland as standing for the proposition that Congress
has unfettered powers when implementing a valid federal treaty. For
example, in Reid v. Covert, the Court stated that “no agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
52
Constitution.” Despite the Court’s statements in Reid, the lower
courts have refused to “reject the broader interpretation that has
been given to Missouri v. Holland” and instead dismiss any
constitutional issues “by noting that the challenged act of Congress
was enacted as a ‘necessary and proper’ means of giving effect to a
53
treaty.” Such was the district court’s position in Bond when it denied
Bond’s motions and agreed with the government’s argument that the
Chemical Weapons Act was a valid constitutional exercise of

47. 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
48. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010).
49. 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
50. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Case Implicating Missouri v. Holland, 107 AM. J.
INT'L L. 432, 433 (2013).
51. 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1028 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the Second Circuit's analysis and conclusion that ‘the Hostage
Taking Convention is well within the boundaries of the Constitution's treaty power,’ and
similarly conclude that Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact
the Hostage Taking Act.”).
52. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
53. John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, CATO SUP. CT. REV.,
185, 200 (2010–11).
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Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Academics have also joined the debate concerning the proper
interpretation of Holland and Congress’s powers when implementing
a valid federal treaty. Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz provided a
unique outlook when he combined the language of the Treaty Clause
with the Necessary and Proper Clause to read as follows: “[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the President’s]
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
55
Treaties.” Using this reading of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Rosenkranz argued that the Necessary and Proper
56
Clause simply grants Congress the power to “make treaties.”
Rosenkranz contended that the term of art “make treaties” does not
57
include the power to give existing treaties domestic legal effect, but
rather allows Congress to create laws that would assist the national
58
government in entering into treaties. For example, the power to
“make treaties” would certainly include “laws appropriating money
59
for the negotiation of treaties” or it could grant Congress the power
to implement legislation that would “ensure the wise use” of the
60
treaty power. Therefore, Rosenkranz determined that Holland’s
statement that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and
61
proper means to execute the powers of the Government” is wrong
62
and thus Holland should be overruled.

54. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 152 (2012).
55. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867,
1882 (2005) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
56. Id. at 1884.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1882.
60. Id. at 1883.
61. 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
62. Rosenkranz, supra note 55, at 1868.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. The Treaty Power Does Not Grant a Federal Police Power
Bond first argues that Congress does not have the power to
criminalize every malicious use of a chemical under 18 U.S.C.A. §
63
229. Allowing Congress to do so would create a federal police power
64
antithetical to the Aritcle I, § 8 enumerated powers. Bond argues
65
that the Constitution reserved the police power to the states, and
that the federal government’s lack of a police power is a bedrock
principle of federalism that protects state sovereignty and individual
66
liberty. Part of maintaining an appropriate balance between state
and federal powers, Bond argues, means assuring that Congress
cannot regulate criminal conduct that is not of a national or
67
international concern. Allowing the Third Circuit’s reading of
Holland to stand would thus create a “loophole through which
68
Congress can circumvent the limits on its enumerated powers.”
Therefore, Bond argues that the government’s reading of Holland
that “any legislation rationally implementing a valid treaty is a valid
69
70
exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause” “cannot be the law.”
Additionally, Bond asserts that the Third Circuit’s reading of
Holland is not only constitutionally impermissible, but that it also
71
contradicts the Court’s opinion in Holland. Bond notes that in
deciding the constitutionality of the MBTA, the Holland Court
balanced relevant state and national interests before deeming the
72
national interests paramount. This weighing of national and state
interests would have been “largely beside the point if federalism
principles were simply irrelevant when the federal government acts
73
pursuant to the treaty power.” Therefore, Bond argues that Holland

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
2012).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Brief for Petitioner at 20, Bond v. United States, No. 12-258 (U.S. May 8, 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. Aug. 1,
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 28.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 68, at 24.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 29.
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is consistent with the proposition that the Treaty Power is subject to
74
federalism restrictions.
2. The Third Circuit’s Holding Undermines the Existence of Nonself-executing Treaties
Bond contends that the government’s theory that “any valid treaty
necessarily expands Congress’s plenary power is also difficult to
reconcile with the critical distinction between self-executing and non75
self-executing treaties.” A self-executing treaty’s validity would be
the proper focus of inquiry by the Third Circuit because if it were
valid, the Supremacy Clause renders it the supreme law of the land
76
without any further action by Congress.
77
A non-self-executing treaty, on the other hand, is “different.”
Bond argues that the Senate ratifies a non-self executing treaty when:
(1) state law can assure that the United States is in compliance with
the treaty, or (2) “with the understanding that state and federal laws”
are currently sufficient to deal with the United States’ obligations
78
under the treaty. Accordingly, Bond argues that the President and
the Senate enter into non-self-executing treaties precisely because
they are wary of the federalism implications and purposely preserve
79
the States’ role in helping to ensure that treaty obligations are met.
Thus, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland that “any
legislation that rationally implements a valid treaty is equally valid” is
wrong because it would undermine not only the Constitution, but also
80
the very existence of non-self-executing treaties.
Finally, Bond states that if Holland does stand to eliminate
81
federalism as a check on the Treaty Power, it should be overruled.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
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3. Section 229 Does Not Need to Include Bond’s Actions
Bond asserts that constitutional avoidance is a “cardinal principle”
of statutory construction demanding that when one interpretation of
a statute raises serious constitutional issues, the court should construe
the statute to avoid those constitutional issues unless it would be
82
contrary to Congress’s intent. Accordingly, Bond argues that a broad
reading of “chemical weapon” under § 229 would make it a “federal
crime to possess bleach or insect repellant while harboring a bad
83
intent.” Bond argues that this outcome demonstrates how a broad
84
reading of § 229 could dangerously intrude on a state’s police power.
Therefore, Bond contends the constitutional avoidance principle of
statutory interpretation should be applied with more force regarding
§ 229 because it addresses the delicate balance of power between the
85
state and federal government.
Bond then claims that Congress did not intend to disrupt the
balance of power between the states and national government when
86
passing § 229. Instead, Congress intended for § 229 to punish “acts
of terrorism” by nation-states and “not every malicious use of
87
chemicals.” As Bond points out, “[n]o one thinks that petitioner’s
88
conduct implicated concerns of the Convention.”
Rather, Bond contends that the best way to interpret § 229 to
coincide with Congress’s intent would be to read the “peaceful
purpose” provision as limiting the statute’s application to non-warlike
89
activities. This definition of “peaceful purpose” would mean that any
non-terrorist and non-warlike use of chemicals, like in Bond’s case,
90
would fall outside § 229’s scope. This interpretation of § 229 would
avoid unintentional consequences by Congress and prevent § 229
91
from exceeding the Convention’s goals. Bond supports this
proposition by demonstrating that this definition of “peaceful
purpose” coincides with its contextual placement in the statute and in
92
the Convention, and it also coincides with its natural meaning.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52–53.
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Further, Bond argues that a non-warlike construction of “peaceful
purpose” would render § 229 constitutional, and ensure that Bond’s
93
use of the chemicals to poison Haynes falls outside § 229’s scope.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
1. Bond Violated § 229
Respondent, the United States, disagrees with Bond’s definition of
“peaceful purpose” and instead states that Bond violated the statute
because Bond’s use of chemicals was not peaceful, but for the specific
94
intent of harming Haynes. Respondent argues that a natural and
plain reading of “peaceful purpose” demonstrates that the use of a
toxic chemical to injure someone is not a “peaceful purpose” but the
95
use of a chemical as a “weapon.”
Respondent also directly confronts Bond’s argument that § 229’s
prohibitions should extend to conduct that would violate the
96
Convention only if undertaken by a state party. Respondent argues
that even if a state party performed non-warlike revenge acts, the
state party’s malicious use of a toxic chemical to injure another would
97
still be prohibited by the Convention.
Further, Respondent counters Bond’s claim that her conduct falls
outside of § 229 because it was not “warlike” or “terrorist” by stating
that any interpretation of § 229 that limits its prohibitions to
98
“warlike” or “terrorist” activities is foreclosed by its plain text.
Rather, Respondent argues that § 229 is purposefully broad and that
it includes exemptions precisely so that any innocent activities are
99
excluded from its reach.
Moreover, Respondent asserts that, unlike Bond’s claims, the
history of the Convention demonstrates it was intended to go beyond
100
warlike and terrorist activities. Rather, the Convention and § 229
101
were intended to prohibit “all malicious use of chemical weapons.”
93. See id. at 56–57 (discussing why defining peaceful purpose as non-warlike will help
further Congress’s intent and noting that Congress did not mean to regulate the malicious
actions of a romantic rival).
94. Brief for Respondent at 13, Bond v. United States, No. 12-258 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2013).
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at 12.
100. Id. at 15.
101. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
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Thus, Respondent argues, prohibiting any party, including Bond, from
using toxic chemicals to injure is entirely consistent with the
102
Convention’s goals.
2. Section 229 is within Congress’s Power to Implement Treaties
Respondent concludes by arguing that § 229 is also a proper
103
application of Congress’s power to implement treaties. Congress has
the authority to prohibit the malicious use of toxic chemicals, and by
104
definition Bond’s conduct, under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Respondent argues that Holland “makes clear” that § 229 is a
105
“necessary and proper effectuation of U.S. treaty obligations.”
Further, Respondent highlights that all of Bond’s arguments
attempting to remove local conduct from within the Treaty Power’s
106
realm have been made and all have failed.
Respondent maintains that procedural safeguards, like the
requirement that treaties be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, have
assured that the delicate balance between state and federal power is
107
not disrupted. Furthermore, the Senate has always been cognizant
of federalism concerns and therefore frequently imposes conditions
108
on treaties. Lastly, Respondent highlights that the Supreme Court
has never invalidated legislation implementing a treaty due to
109
federalism concerns.
V. ANALYSIS
The following subsections detail the different routes that the
Supreme Court can take when reviewing Bond, and then analyzes
each routes’ strengths and weaknesses.

102. See id. (“State Parties agreed to enact legislation that would prohibit individuals from
‘undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.’”).
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 39.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id. at 42.
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A. The Court can Uphold the Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Holland
and Affirm Bond’s Conviction
Bond v. United States presents an as-applied challenge to the
110
Chemical Weapons Act. Although Haynes only sustained a chemical
111
burn to her thumb, Bond’s actions could have seriously injured
Haynes and her baby. Therefore, it would be morally unattractive to
let Bond escape punishment just because her actions do not implicate
international issues. At oral argument, Justice Kagan in particular
seemed hesitant to let the severity of Bond’s actions pass as a
112
“peaceful purpose” under § 229. Justice Kagan illustrated this
concern by asking what if a chemist released Sarin gas through the
ducts of his neighbor’s house and ended up killing everyone in the
113
house? Justice Kagan’s hypothetical, where the neighbor’s use of
Sarin gas is also completely domestic and does not implicate any
international concerns, emphasizes the moral unattractiveness of
letting Bond’s actions go unpunished. This concern weighs in favor of
upholding the Third Circuit’s intepretation of Holland. If upheld,
then § 229 would be constitutionally valid as applied to Bond.
Would this line of reasoning mean, as Chief Justice Roberts
questioned, that Congress’s powers “to intrude upon the police
power” of the states would be “unlimited” when passing legislation to
114
implement a treaty? Yes. If Holland is allowed to stand as the Third
Circuit interprets it, the Treaty Power could be used to “undo the
carefully wrought edifice of a limited government assigned only
115
certain enumerated powers.” Congress could essentially legislate in
any area of law when implementing a non-self-executing treaty
because the legislation will most likely pass the loose rational basis
scrutiny of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This would effectively
grant Congress a police power that contradicts our Constitution’s
delegation of “few and defined” powers to the federal government
116
but “numerous and definite” powers to the states.
110. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012).
111. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. Nov. 5,
2013).
113. Id. at 14–15.
114. Id. at 43.
115. John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 185, 202 (2010–11).
116. John R. Crook, ed., Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Case Implicating Missouri v.
Holland, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 432, 434 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James
Madison)).
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Nonetheless, the massive potential expansion of federal power to
the derogation of states’ rights, and the lukewarm reception of three
justices to this prospect, means the Court will most likely reject the
Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland but affirm Bond’s
conviction.
B. The Court Can Avoid the Constitutional Question All Together
The facts of Bond distinctly pose the question of whether
Congress can act beyond its enumerated powers when implementing
117
a valid non-self-executing treaty. Although the Supreme Court
could tackle this difficult question, the Court can also avoid it by
taking one of two routes.
1. Bond’s Actions Constituted a “Peaceful Purpose”
First, the Court can hold that § 229 does not apply to Bond.
Section 229 makes it illegal to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess,
118
or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.” Section 229F then
defines chemical weapon as “a toxic chemical and its precursors,
except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this
119
chapter.” A toxic chemical is “any chemical which through its
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
120
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” The term
“purpose not prohibited under this chapter” includes peaceful
purposes that are defined as any purpose “related to an industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other
121
activity.”
Bond stole the 10–chloro10H–phenoxarsine to poison Haynes
122
from Rohm & Haas, a chemical manufacturer. Presumably, at the
time Bond stole the chemicals, Rohm & Haas was manufacturing
them for a scientific purpose. Therefore, the Court can rule that
Bond’s actions fall under the “peaceful purpose” provision of
§229F(7)(a). However, this analysis may prove too much because the
moment that Bond used the 10-cholor10H-phenoxarsine to poison

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Eastman, supra note 115, at 201.
18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013).
18 U.S.C.A. § 229F(1)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
§ 229F(8)(a).
§ 229F(7)(a).
United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Haynes, she was clearly using the chemical to harm to Haynes. Since
124
the 10-cholor10H-phenoxarsine had the ability to harm Haynes, it
125
was clearly a “toxic chemical” as defined under § 229F. Bond’s
126
attempts at poisoning Haynes, therefore, would easily qualify as a
127
“use” of a chemical weapon under § 229. Quite simply, the language
of the Chemical Weapons Act is very broad and finding a loophole for
Bond’s actions would be difficult if not impossible.
2. Clear Statement Requirement
Second, the Court can employ a clear statement rule and hold that
§ 229 does not apply to Bond. The clear statement rule demands that
if Congress intends to disrupt the constitutional balance between the
states and the federal government, it must make itself unmistakably
128
clear in doing so. Therefore, if Congress is not absolutely clear that it
has intended to preempt traditional state power, the Court will read
the statute as not disrupting the balance between state and federal
129
power.
Here, the Treaty’s Annex lists three “Schedules” of chemicals that
130
are absolutely prohibited by the Treaty. These listed chemicals are
not exclusive, however, because the Convention also provides
information to help place a non-listed chemical into the appropriate
131
Schedule.
Nonetheless as Justice Breyer noted during oral
argument, “once you depart from the annexes in defining the
132
chemicals, you throw into it a list a thousand miles long.” Justice
Breyer also noted that reading § 229 to include chemicals not listed in
the Annex, like the chemicals Bond used to poison Haynes, can
encroach on a state’s power to punish its citizens.
Therefore, the Court can find that § 229 is not clear enough when
preempting a state’s right to punish its citizen for its “garden variety”

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See § 229F(8)(a) (West 2013) (A toxic chemical is “any chemical which through its
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals.”).
126. Bond, 581 F.3d at 131.
127. See U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013); see also § 229F(1)(a).
128. Gregory v. Aschroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
129. Id.
130. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, supra note 12, at annex.
131. Id. at annex, part IV.
132. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, at 48.

PERAL 5 18 14 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

194

5/19/2014 2:53 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

crimes and it can decide to apply a clear statement requirement. The
Court can read § 229 as only being concerned with the chemicals
133
specified in the Treaty’s Annex. Since the chemicals that Bond used
134
to poison Haynes are not on this list, the Court can hold that § 229
does not apply to Bond and reverse her conviction. Justice Breyer
seemed to favor this argument when he said that limiting § 229 to the
chemicals listed in the Annex is an “easy way” to determine § 229’s
135
scope.
C. The Court Can Impose Limitations on Congress’s Powers When
Implementing a Non-self-Executing Treaty
Although the Court can take one of the two routes discussed
136
above, the Court can also decisively end the debate concerning
Holland’s holding and dictate the appropriate scope of Congress’s
powers when implementing a non-self-executing treaty.
When the Holland Court held that when a treaty “is valid there
can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of
137
the Government,” it may not have foreseen one particular scenario:
Congress deviating greatly from a treaty when passing the
implementing legislation.
Holland dealt with the constitutionality of the MBTA that was
passed by Congress to implement the Convention between the
United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds
138
(the Migratory Bird Convention). The Migratory Bird Convention’s
mission was to preserve migratory birds and to save them “from
139
indiscriminate slaughter.” The MBTA then made it illegal to
“pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill . . . ship, export, import” or to attempt
140
to do the foregoing to “any migratory bird.” The rest of the MBTA
specified the ways in which it was illegal to commit such actions, listed
exceptions, and included detailed procedures for punishing those who
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 68Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26.
134. See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
their Destruction, supra note 12, at art. 1.
135. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, at 35.
136. See supra Part V.B.1–2.
137. 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
138. Id.
139. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, supra note 4.
140. 16 U.S.C.A. § 703 (West 2013).

PERAL 5 18 14 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/19/2014 2:53 PM

DECIPHERING MISSOURI V. HOLLAND

195

141

have committed such crimes. The MBTA, therefore, only penalized
what was specifically stated in the Bird Convention.
By contrast, § 229 deviates significantly from the Convention. The
Convention specifically states that its obligations are that each state
party must promise never:
To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
weapons to anyone;
To use chemical weapons;
To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any
142
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

The reason for these restrictions is spelled out in the Preamble:
each State Party is interested in “achieving effective progress towards
143
general and complete disarmament.” Clearly, the Convention was
aimed at making sure each sovereign nation involved would refrain
from any sort of chemical warfare. Section 229 deviates from this
focus on state parties and instead makes it unlawful for “any person”
to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly,
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any
144
chemical weapon.” Section 229’s focus on individuals goes beyond
the Convention’s international peacekeeping concerns, and in doing
so, it heavily encroaches on a state’s right to punish its citizens for
their crimes.
The MBTA’s close conformity to its respective treaty is likely
indicative of treaty legislation at the time Holland was decided. The
Holland Court probably did not take into account the ever-expanding
latitude that Congress would later bestow upon itself when passing
legislation to implement non-self-executing treaties. Therefore, the
Court should not uphold the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland.
Instead, the Court should determine the true meaning of Holland’s
holding and also either: (1) create a new nexus test to limit Congress’s
powers when passing treaty-implementing legislation; or (2) impose a
subject matter limitation on Congress when passing treaty-

141. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703–710 (West 2013).
142. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, supra note 12, at art. 1.
143. Id. at pmbl.
144. 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
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implementing legislation.

1. The Court Can Overrule the Third Circuit by Creating a New
Nexus Test
Justice Kennedy noted that Bond’s case turns on the breadth of
the Necessary and Proper Clause when he stated that “[t]he ultimate
issue of the statute’s validity turns in part on whether the law can be
deemed ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ the
145
President’s Article II, § 2 Treaty Power.” By pointing to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Kennedy signaled that the
broad interpretation given to Holland by the Third Circuit is
146
misplaced. What, then, is the potential solution? A more radical, yet
efficient, solution would be for the Court to uphold Holland and
create a different nexus test for Congress when it uses the Necessary
and Proper Power in conjunction with the Treaty Power.
Under current law, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress the authority to enact a particular statute as long as that
statute is “rationally related to the implementation of a
147
constitutionally enumerated power.” The Necessary and Proper
Clause, in conjunction with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
Holland, allows Congress to pass any legislation as long as it is
rationally related to a valid treaty. This is a very loose standard that
grants Congress a large amount of discretion when passing treatyimplementing legislation.
If the Court wanted to protect federalism and simultaneously
maintain the benefit of Holland, which grants Congress powers
beyond those enumerated to it in the Constitution when
implementing a treaty, the Court can tighten the nexus test when
Congress uses the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a nonself-executing treaty. Deciphering the new nexus test would not only
be unprecedented, it would also be very difficult. How tightly would
the treaty-implementing legislation need to relate to the Convention?
How closely would a treaty-implementing statute need to track its
respective treaty? These questions the Court would need to answer.

145. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367 (2011) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
146. See Eastman, supra note 115, at 194.
147. United States v. Comstock, 50 U.S. 126, 134 (2010).
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Although this solution was not proposed during oral arguments,
tightening the nexus for the Necessary and Proper Clause when used
to implement a non-self-executing treaty is a great solution. First, it
maintains the benefit of Holland and allows Congress to legislate
beyond its enumerated powers when implementing a treaty. Second, it
would avoid the trouble of having to overrule Holland, which has
persisted for decades. Third, it would require Congress to more tightly
connect treaty-implementing legislation to the respective treaty and
therefore protect states’ rights by diminishing the likelihood that
Congress encroaches on state authority.
Fourth, a tighter standard would help avoid overbroad treaty
implementing statutes that lead to absurd results. For example, Justice
Alito pointed out during oral argument that “pouring a bottle of
vinegar in [a] friend’s goldfish bowl” would be illegal under § 229 and
148
expose a person to several years in federal prison.
Section 229’s
overbroad language can penalize a variety of actions that were not
targeted by the Convention. This is a direct consequence of Holland
because treaty implementing legislation only needs to meet
deferential rational basis review. A tighter nexus test when Congress
uses its Necessary and Proper Power to implement a non-selfexecuting treaty, on the other hand, would require Congress to more
narrowly tailor treaty-implementing legislation to its respective treaty.
Under the new nexus test, Congress would be required to pass
legislation to implement a treaty but Congress could not go any
further than what is necessary to implement the treaty.
Here, a tighter nexus test would result in overruling the Third
Circuit’s interpretation of Holland’s holding. Also, it would most
probably mean that § 229 is unconstitutional as applied to Bond and
Bond’s conviction would need to be reversed. This would all depend,
however, on what the Court would determine is an appropriate nexus
between a treaty and its implementing legislation and whether the
Chemical Weapons Act is appropriately related to the Convention.

148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No.
09-1227).
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2. The Court Can Overrule the Third Circuit by Creating a
Subject Matter Limitation
Second, the Court can impose a subject matter limitation on
Congress’s powers when used in conjunction with the Treaty Power.
Under this solution if Congress wanted to pass legislation
implementing a treaty that would exceed the treaty’s scope, it would
only be allowed to do so if it was still regulating a matter of
international concern. This solution, like the tighter nexus test
149
proposed above, would protect states’ rights by diminishing the
opportunity for Congress to encroach on traditional state power.
However, the subject matter limitation also has its setbacks. First,
imposing a subject matter limitation would go against the ideals of the
150
Framers who desired a broad and substantive Treaty Power.
Second, in today’s world almost any issue “can plausibly be labeled
151
‘international’” and the definition of an “international” issue will
“undoubtedly vary over time, as world conditions and relationships
152
between nations change.” Therefore, placing a subject matter
limitation on treaty-implementing legislation may prove to be more
difficult than it seems.
Nonetheless, this solution would mean that the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of Holland would need to be overruled. Further, it
would mean that § 229 is unconstitutional as applied to Bond because
Bond’s prosecution does not implicate international concerns. Bond’s
prosecution is not of concern to the Convention’s parties, and if the
United States had not prosecuted Bond, it would not have been in
violation of the Convention. Therefore, under this solution, the
Chemical Weapons Act would be unconstitutional to the extent that it
criminalizes purely domestic behavior that does not affect the United
States’ obligations under the Convention.

149. See supra Part V.C.1.
150. Oona A. Hathaway, Spencer Amdur, Celia Choy, Samir Deger-Sen, John Paredes,
Sally Pei, & Haley Nix Proctor, The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 239, 245 (2013).
151. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
451–52 (1998).
152. Id. at 454.

PERAL 5 18 14 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/19/2014 2:53 PM

DECIPHERING MISSOURI V. HOLLAND

199

D. The Court Can Overrule Holland and Confine Congress’s Powers
The last, and least likely route that the Court can take is to
overrule Holland. The Court can hold that non-self-executing treaties
can only regulate domestically to the extent that Congress has the
constitutional authority to do so. The Treaty Power, therefore, would
153
not confer on Congress any additional regulatory powers. This
would be a radical step toward protecting the federalist principles the
Framers adamantly sought to preserve. This is very unlikely, however,
because this approach is a “novel proposition” with “few adherents
154
and little legal support.” Further, this option did not garner a lot of
155
support during oral argument.
If the Court did take this route, it could rule § 229 unconstitutional
as exceeding Congress’s Constitutional authority and Bond’s
conviction would be reversed. On the other hand, if the Court
considers § 229 constitutional, then Bond’s conviction would be
affirmed.
VI. CONCLUSION
A five-page opinion published over ninety years ago has spurred a
tremendous amount of debate concerning the scope of Congress’s
powers when implementing valid non-self-executing treaties. Bond v.
United States provides an ideal set of facts that nicely present the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to definitively dictate Congress’s
powers when implementing a non-self-executing treaty and therefore
156
to decisively end the debate concerning Holland.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 456.
Oona et al., supra note 150, at 283.
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112.
581 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2009).

